USA v. Amin Rashid by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-22-2016 
USA v. Amin Rashid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Amin Rashid" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 76. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/76 
This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2269 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AMIN A. RASHID,  
a/k/a Larry Doby Wilson, a/k/a Jonothan F. Stone, III  
a/k/a Alfred Monger, a/k/a Otello Karpo  
a/k/a Christine Harriell, a/k/a Ortello Karpo 
 
Amin A. Rashid, 
            Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. Pa. No. 2-93-cr-00264-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Jan E. DuBois 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 19, 2016 
 
Before:   JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 22, 2016) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Amin Rashid appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania revoking his supervised release.  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to 
resolve this appeal.1  In 1993, Rashid was convicted in the District Court of thirty counts 
of wire fraud, two counts of mail fraud, thirteen counts of money laundering, and eight 
counts of laundering proceeds of unlawful activity.  He was sentenced to 168 months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  One condition of the supervised 
release was that Rashid “not commit another federal, state or local crime.” (App. D at 2.) 
 Rashid began his supervised release in September 2005.  He was indicted in 
August 2008 for a separate fraud scheme, again in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
A jury found him guilty of nine counts of mail fraud and eight counts of aggravated 
identity theft, and the District Court entered judgment and sentence in 2013.   
Not long after his second fraud scheme came to light, the government filed a 
petition seeking to hold Rashid guilty of violating his supervised release.  In February 
                                              
1 Though this is Rashid’s first time before us to contest the revocation of his 
supervised release, he is no stranger.  He has (so far) brought over 60 appeals relating to a 
1993 conviction and 11 appeals relating to a 2013 conviction.  We have found merit in 
only one of those serial appeals, allowing him to discharge his 1993 restitution obligation 
in bankruptcy.  See In re Rashid, 210 F.3d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).  We note 
this history only to reinforce that Rashid has had abundant opportunity to vent his 
objections to both sets of convictions, but that has not stopped him from raising the 
objections again, this time in the guise of appealing the revocation of his supervised 
release. 
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2015, the government filed an updated petition, citing Rashid’s 2013 conviction and 
sentence on the 2008 charges.  The District Court held a revocation hearing, and, on April 
17, 2015, it revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to fourteen months’ 
imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in 2013.  The Court 
denied Rashid’s motion to reconsider its revocation order, and this timely appeal 
followed. 
II. Discussion2 
 Rashid does not dispute that he was convicted of a federal crime for his conduct 
during his supervised release.3  That disposes of this appeal, since Rashid’s arguments are 
actually directed to his 1993 and 2013 convictions, arguments that he may not properly 
bring in appealing the revocation of his supervised release.  See United States v. Warren, 
335 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that “the validity of an underlying conviction or 
sentence may not be collaterally attacked in a supervised release revocation proceeding 
and may be challenged only on direct appeal or through a habeas corpus proceeding,” and 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over the original case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 
and over revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “The 
District Court’s decision to revoke supervised release is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
... [T]he factual findings supporting that decision are reviewed for clear error; legal issues 
are subject to de novo review.”  United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal citation omitted). 
 
3 As the District Court properly noted in its hearing on the petition for violation of 
supervised release, that admission is “the only issue” that determines this case.  (Supp. 
App. at 5.)  At the hearing, Rashid agreed with that statement, (id.), and agreed to “admit 
that specific charged violation,” namely his conviction in violation of the terms of his 
supervised release, (id. at 6).   
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collecting cases from other circuits holding the same).  Moreover, even were it 
permissible in the abstract to consider Rashid’s challenges to his underlying convictions, 
we could not do so in this case because the objections he raises now have already been 
raised (over and over again) and adequately addressed.4 
Rashid’s additional contention that the District Court displayed bias against him in 
its revocation hearing is without merit.  The Court’s unwillingness to “rehash the basis 
for the conviction in the 1993 case or the 2008 case,” (Supp. App. at 36), was not bias – it 
was a straightforward application of the law. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
4 With regard to Rashid’s challenges to his 1993 conviction, we have repeatedly 
addressed and rejected his argument that the indictment was constructively amended and 
expired.  E.g., Rashid v. Warden Phila. FDC, 617 F. App’x 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2015).  
Consequently, the District Court committed no error in declining before the revocation 
hearing to resolve Rashid’s claims related to the record for his 1993 conviction. 
With regard to Rashid’s challenges to his 2013 conviction, his hyper-literal 
distinction between “mail” and “United States Mail” in the indictment was addressed and 
rejected by the District Court during the course of his prosecution on those charges.  (See 
Supp. App. at 301-02 n.1.)  We affirmed that conviction on direct appeal.  United States 
v. Rashid, 593 F. App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2340 (2015).  In that 
appeal, we also rejected the claims Rashid now makes about judicial bias, id. at 134-35, 
and we observed that he had waived the argument he now asserts that his acts of identity 
theft did not affect interstate commerce, id. at 138 n.22. 
